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Abstract 
This thesis will first investigate the Falklands War aboard the Task Force deployed at the Falkland 
Islands in the 1982 campaign, where Argentina claimed and conquered the islands, and then the 
United Kingdom reclaimed them. The second part of this thesis focuses on the newspaper coverage 
of the crisis, using The Sun and The Guardian as examples of how the coverage varies from one end 
of the journalistic correctness spectrum to the another. Aiding this analysis is field pioneer Norman 
Fairclough’s take on Critical Discourse Analysis, CDA for short. His four “stages” of CDA will 
provide the means of dissecting both newspapers and determining their reasons of writing the way 
they did. Tying these two parts together are the situations, where the press themselves played a role 
in the course of events, such as the Battle of Goose Green. The Sun being a tabloid and The Guardian 
a broadsheet, the findings in the analysis correlate to the general norm that broadsheets produce more 
reliable and professional content than tabloids, and tabloids often carry political agendas. 
Keywords: The Falklands War, British military, Margaret Thatcher, The Sun, The 
Guardian, Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
Tiivistelmä 
Tutkielman tarkoitus on ensin tarkastella Falklandin sotaa historiallisesta näkökulmasta, pääpainona 
itse sotilaat Falklandin saarilla. Vuonna 1982 käydyssä sodassa Argentiina valtasi saaret 
voimakeinoin, ja Yhdistyneet Kuningaskunnat (Britannia) joutui ne valtaamaan takaisin. Tutkielman 
toinen osa tarkastelee sanomalehtien The Sun ja The Guardian otsikkoja ja artikkeleita sodasta, ja 
miten ne eroavat toisistaan. Tähän analyysiin käytetään Norman Faircloughin kriittistä 
diskurssianalyysia. Hänen kuvailemansa neljä ”tasoa” auttavat ensin avaamaan ja sitten tutkimaan 
molempia sanomalehtiä, ja päättelemään syyt sille, miksi lehdet kirjoittivat juuri niin kuin ne tekivät. 
Näitä kahta osaa sitovat yhteen tapahtumat, joiden kulkuun medialla oli suora tai epäsuora vaikutus, 
kuten Goose Greenin taistelu. Koska The Sun on tabloidi ja The Guardian perinteinen sanomalehti, 
tutkielman havainnot viittaavat yleiseen normiin, jonka mukaan perinteiset sanomalehdet tuottavat 
luotettavampaa ja ammattimaisempaa sisältöä kuin tabloidit, joilla usein on poliittisia 
taustapyrkimyksiä. 
Avainsanat: Falklandin sota, Britannian asevoimat, Margaret Thatcher, The Sun, The 
Guardian, Kriittinen diskurssianalyysi 
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1. Introduction 
The Falklands War was an armed conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina in 1982 for 
control over the Falkland Islands in Southern Atlantic. The conflict resulted in a decisive British 
victory, and the control of the islands remained with them. Going into war was rallied by Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher, first female Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. It was a big 
gamble, since her support was declining, but winning the war boosted her numbers again. Losing 
the war would have been disastrous both for her and the British Commonwealth as a whole. One of 
the main reasons to go to war was to demonstrate British military power, and their will to defend 
the entire Commonwealth. If the Falkland Islands would have been forfeited, other border disputes 
would have followed. 
This thesis will first go through the key events of the Falklands War and the reasons of the British 
victory. Knowing and understanding the way the war played out is important for the analysis part of 
the thesis, and the first part’s main role is to demonstrate the power discrepancies between United 
Kingdom and Argentina, preparing the reader for the analysis. Media representatives aboard the 
warships deployed to the Falklands played an important role not only in the course of events, but 
also in the way the general public back in the United Kingdom perceived the conflict. Analysing the 
newspapers of the era, focusing on the headlines, will provide us with information on how the 
papers reported of the Falklands War, and more importantly why. 
The research questions for the analysis are: 
1. What made Argentina and the United Kingdom go to war? 
Why did UK win and what were the key points in the campaign? 
2. What difference is there between The Sun’s and The Guardian’s content? 
Is their content reliable, neutral and relevant to their audience? 
3. Why did the newspapers write the way they did? 
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2. The Falkland Islands 
The Falkland Islands (referred to as the Falklands) are a remote cluster of British-claimed islands 
east of the Argentinian coast, consisting of 2 large and around 780 smaller islands. Their climate is 
habitable, with summers being a bit cooler than European, but winters being warmer. In 1980, as it 
was the most recent data relative to this thesis, the population of the islands was 1 813 in total, 
mostly concentrated in the capital city of Stanley. The Falklands and their sea area cover 4 618 
square miles (11 960 square kilometres) of the South Atlantic. (Freedman, 2005a, p. 14.) See figure 
1 for details. 
Since the Falklands are only 500 kilometres off the coast of Argentina, their ownership has been a 
source of arguments since 1833, when the islands were announced part of the Commonwealth. 
Argentina has claimed that the islands belong to it, but this contest has never been held in 
international court. For 15 years there had been talks in the British Government about the ownership 
of the islands, even to the point that some people were ready to give the Islands’ sovereignty to 
Argentina. The Falklands War raised the people’s will to hold on to the Islands, both on the Islands 
and in Britain. (Freedman, 2005a, p. 15.) 
 
Figure 1. Map of the Falkland Islands.   
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3. Falkland Islands War of 1982 
In December 1981, a new Junta took over Argentina, led by General Galtieri, commander of the 
Argentinian army, now the president. Along with his comrades, Admiral Anaya, chief of the Navy 
and General Dozo, chief of the Air Force, General Galtieri now ran the whole country as the leader 
of the military Junta. (Freedman, 2005a, p. 132) This radical change of government lead to 
expansionism, and the Junta set their sights on Falkland Islands, a British-owned territory east off 
the coast of Argentina.  
On March 31st, 1982, the Argentine Task Force was finalizing its preparations to invade the 
Falklands. Intelligence reports reached the UK, and since the islands are across the Atlantic from 
them and so close to Argentina, the government knew that holding off the invasion was impossible. 
First Sea Lord (Chief of the British Navy), Admiral Sir Henry Leach told the government that 
reoccupation of the islands was possible, but it would take all the naval and aviation power that 
Britain could send. The force gathered and sent to the Falklands would consist of both of UK’s 
aircraft carriers, their escorting ships, and a commando brigade with amphibious assault 
capabilities. Already stationed on the Falklands were a platoon of Royal Marines, 69 members to be 
exact. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 17.) A platoon cannot hold off an entire invading army, but an armed 
threat can force the invader to move cautiously and not to risk getting ambushed. The operation was 
named as CORPORATE (Freedman, 2005b, p. 18). 
Local government on the Falkland Islands was warned about the invasion on April 1st. The Royal 
Marines on the islands were setting up ambushes and Governor Rex Hunt told the islanders via 
radio to stay home and remain calm. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 19). The Argentinians wanted to land on 
the night of March 31st, but weather conditions set them back for a full 24 hours. The invasion 
begun in the morning of April 2nd, with approximately 1 000 men. Their advance was barely 
slowed, and the Royal Marines were resorted to defending the Government House in Stanley. The 
Marines fended off the attackers once, but were ultimately forced to surrender, and Governor Hunt 
was flown out of the islands. By then, the islands were completely in Argentinian control. 
(Freedman, 2005b, p. 22.) 
 
3.1 British Retaliation 
In the morning of April 2nd, London time, so four hours behind Stanley, the Cabinet met in London. 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher decided to take a risk and propose a diplomatic and armed 
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response. Operation CORPORATE was in effect and the ships were getting prepared to sail to the 
Falkland Islands, but the decision of setting sail and engaging the enemy was not in the military’s 
hands. In the evening, the Cabinet had made its decision and the Task Force would depart as soon 
as possible. This decision was done in the spirit of showing to the world that the United Kingdom 
would guarantee the safety of all its citizens, no matter how far they would be. (Freedman, 2005b, 
p. 26.) 
As the voyage from the UK to the Falkland Islands takes from three weeks to a month, in the month 
of April, the fighting was mainly diplomatic and economic. On May 2nd, the Task Force fought its 
first battle against an enemy naval component. The submarine SSN Conqueror fired two torpedoes 
at the ARA General Belgrano, and both hit. The Argentinian destroyer was sinking and on fire, with 
some 200 men dead in the initial explosions. The rest of the men on board were scuttling the ship, 
leaving her to sink. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 196.) This event would be reported by The Sun, with their 
rather infamous “GOTCHA” headline (see figure 2), which, to this day, remains in people’s 
memories about the Falklands War. This is one key event that will be discussed in the newspaper 
analysis segment of this thesis. 
The sinking of the Belgrano would not be left unanswered by the Argentinians. On days before and 
on May 4th, there were multiple accounts of Argentinian air activity near the British Task Force. A 
pair of French-made Super Étendard -fighter jets took off from Rio Grande and found the British 
ships HMS Glasgow and HMS Sheffield. Glasgow released counter-measures, and the Argentinian 
jets took aim at Sheffield with their Exocet-missiles. Two missiles were released, and one of them 
hit Sheffield. She caught fire in multiple compartments, and even with the aid of fellow ships Arrow 
and Yarmouth, the fire could not be stopped. After an hour of firefighting, in fear of a second strike, 
the captain ordered the ship to be abandoned. (Freedman, 2005b, pp. 200-202.) The loss of a ship 
was a big setback for the British, and the victory over Belgrano was overshadowed by it.  
 
3.2 The Landing at San Carlos 
As the diplomatic and media warfronts kept going, the military component had their fair share of 
action as well. On May 7th, HMS Broadsword and HMS Coventry were positioned to intercept any 
airplanes flying to or from Stanley airport, to cut off the Argentinian supply route. 2 days later, May 
9th, they shot at a C130 Hercules trying to land in Stanley but missed. A stroke of luck for the 
British was that the deterrent was enough, and the plane veered back to mainland Argentina. Post-
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war studies proved that this was a setback for the Argentinian force on the Falklands; many further 
air supply operations were cancelled in fear of losing precious cargo planes. The invasion force was 
large and needed a large amount of supplies to operate. They estimated that they would last for 
anywhere up to around 2 weeks, until 26th or the 27th, but at that date, a 75-tonne resupply would be 
necessary. The effect of this blockade was very demoralizing among the Argentinian soldiers 
suffering from various illnesses in the bad weather. (Freedman, 2005b, pp. 276-277.) 
The Argentinians garrisoned on the Falkland Islands felt severely let down by the mainland. Their 
air and naval components were passive, in fear of the British fighters and sea-to-air capabilities. 
Argentina was perfectly fine with stalling, since they assumed that Britain would not want to siege 
the islands forever, but to land someday. There, they would pull out their reserves and repel the 
British. This stalling would also provide time for negotiations and gaining support worldwide. Only 
issue is, that the troops on the islands continue to suffer from poor conditions and ever withering 
supplies. The British Task Force was prepared to keep up the siege and demoralise the occupiers 
even further, and then take the islands with relative ease. Stanley’s garrison was the largest, and if it 
fell, the smaller forces around the islands would have little reason to continue the fight. The feat 
would be made no easier by the fact that Stanley was overlooked by hills that were very defendable, 
and the Argentinians had already fortified them. Retaking the capital city would take valuable time 
and even more valuable lives, especially if somehow the Argentinian’s morale had held. (Freedman, 
2005b, pp. 287-289.) 
Reclaiming the islands could not be done by sieging alone, so both sides knew that a landing would 
take place, but the Argentinians would not know when. On May 18th, the Task Force was finally 
equipped with its coastal assault component, and preparations for a landing could begin. The 
original plan was to land all the 2 000 men aboard a single amphibious assault ship, but this was 
deemed too risky, and on May 19th, the forces were split in three. During this transfer, a Sea King 
helicopter transporting 30 men was hit by a bird and fell to the ocean. 22 men lost their lives, 8 were 
able to escape in time, as the helicopter sank immediately. This accident overshadowed the 
operation, but all preparations were completed, and the landing force was ready. The plan was to 
land in three phases: First, a simultaneous beach landing and a paratrooper landing on the 
mountains, then artillery and air defence would be brought by helicopters, and finally the last 
infantrymen would land ashore and move forward to observe the enemy movements. (Freedman, 
2005b, pp. 298-301.) 
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On May 21st, around midnight, the landing was set to begin. HMS Glamorgan was distracting the 
Argentines by bombing around Stanley, and HMS Ardent did the same at Goose Green. Three hours 
later, an expedition team was sent ashore to deal with an Argentinian group close to the landing 
spot. After naval gunfire and mortar fire, the Argentinians retreated, but kept fighting back. The 
British force drove them back, inflicing 12 casualties and taking 9 prisoners. At 3.30 in the 
morning, the actual landing took place. The weather was favourable and there were no hostiles at 
the landing site. Only a confused Special Forces patrol was there, since they expected the landing to 
be the day after. Securing the village of San Carlos, the landing force met 31 civilians, 14 of them 
children. The day of May 21st was spent establishing a defendable position in San Carlos, setting up 
artillery and anti-air weapons. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 302.) 
 
3.3 Argentinian Bombing Runs 
At the same time, the Argentinians were suspecting something in San Carlos. There were reports 
coming in from Stanley and Goose Green, but a sighting of amphibious assaults by a helicopter and 
the report from the troops that escaped the expedition team had the Argentinians investigate further. 
A group of nine Dagger fighter jets was sent from the mainland, and reached the islands an hour 
later, attacking the ships in the coastal waters. No lives were lost, but 2 ships received damage. 
Later waves hit the HMS Ardent, causing it to take in water, lose steering and power to its missile 
systems. Further attacks came in, and the ship had only small arms to defend itself. Catching fire as 
well, there was no hope for Ardent, and it was evacuated and left to sink, much like the Sheffield. 
(Freedman, 2005b, p. 303.) 
Expecting the landing, the Argentinians kept their air component hidden for almost a month, and 
now brought them into battle. 45 flights reached the Falklands, and in them, ten planes were lost 
and more had to be grounded for repairs. In their plan to defeat the landing force, the Argentinians’ 
emphasis was in inflicting as much casualties as possible without risking the fighter jets. This 
failed, as the pilots sometimes targeted friendly ships in their hurry to get back, and sometimes 
failing to see intercepting aircraft or anti-air fire from the British ships. Also, as they had to fly as 
low as possible to avoid radar detection, the Argentinian fighters’ bombs had no time to arm their 
explosives in flight, causing the bombs that hit not explode, further diminishing the victories 
Argentinians so desperately wanted to gain. Even though only two of the ships in the vicinity of San 
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Carlos were unscathed, and the Ardent abandoned, Argentina’s air attacks did not deter the actual 
landing and base establishing in the settlement itself. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 304.) 
On the day following the landing, May 22nd, it was clear to the Argentinians that the British landing 
was successful and the area now heavily fortified, armed with artillery and anti-air guns, and it 
would be close to impossible to suppress its growth and movement. Only 2 waves of fighter jets 
could be sent from the mainland, due to losses and need of repairs. This quieter day was a relief for 
the British, especially since the Rapier anti-air missile system was underperforming and having 
technical issues. The Sea Harriers aboard British aircraft carriers were free to fly above the islands 
again, conducting scouting missions, but found no hostile aircraft. Instead, they found out that the 
Falkland Islands native ship MV Monsunen was captured by the Argentinians, ferrying men and 
supplies across the strait between the islands. An assault force was prepared to capture the ship, but 
when naval gunfire was used to stop the vessel, its crew decided to beach the ship to prevent 
capture. The ship was left there for later, as it was of no value now. (Freedman, 2005b, pp. 306-
308.) 
The morning of May 23rd saw an improvement in weather, and it was clear that the flight activity 
would increase. Argentinian forces were keen on finding the two British aircraft carriers, but were 
still unable to do so, even with repeated search flights. Attacks on the British fortification kept 
going. In the afternoon, four Argentinian A4B fighter jets entered the airspace, and were met with 
anti-air and small arms fire by the Britons. The fighters’ main target was HMS Antelope, which had 
just recently arrived at the Falkland Islands. Yet again, as the fighters had to fly very low to avoid 
radar detection, the bombs dropped did not have time to properly arm themselves in flight, and 
therefore did not detonate on impact. One A4B even collided with the mast of the Antelope and 
crashed. A few more waves of jets arrived shortly after, but no ship or jets were hit. Two 
unexploded bombs were stuck in the side of Antelope, and as the crew tried to defuse and remove 
one, it exploded, killing one and wounding another, and setting off a fire. It was quick to spread, 
and an order to abandon ship was issued shortly after. Just as the last crew members were able to 
escape, ordnance aboard the ship exploded, leaving HMS Antelope to sink near San Carlos. This 
raised a lot of concern back in the United Kingdom, especially knowing that on-board HMS 
Argonaut there was still one unexploded bomb. The Task Force realised by this point, that the hills 
surrounding the bay were hindering air defence capabilities, most importantly radars warning of 
incoming hostile fighters. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 309.) 
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It had become evident that the exchange of fighter jets to warships would prove fatal to the Task 
Force sooner or later. Final attempts of diplomacy were in consideration, as the international 
pressure kept building up. The British Government did not try to justify their actions by using 
strategic and economic reasons, such as oil or the islands’ location near Latin America. Instead, the 
government appealed to the moral laws of self-defence, the islanders’ right to self-determination, 
importance of not rewarding aggression, and showing that using force or violence would not yield 
results. If the British would surrender at Falklands, other Commonwealth countries could be targets 
for aggression. Therefore, as remote and insignificant the Falkland Islands seemed, they could not 
be given up, to reinforce the integrity and pride of the Commonwealth. Mainland Europe was 
strongly with Britain, and NATO declared that they would support the UK in their campaign. 
(Freedman, 2005b, p. 322.) 
United States of America gave massive support to the United Kingdom during the war, both 
military and political, and the economical sanctions set on Argentina by President Ronald Reagan 
were effectively crippling the nation’s economy, as trade with the US was important to them. But, 
the atmosphere in Europe was shifting. France and West Germany were pushing Britain to seek a 
cease-fire, and even the Pope encouraged Prime Minister Thatcher to do so. Thatcher still held 
strongly to her opinion, that aggression would not be rewarded, and the Falkland Islands would not 
be surrendered. Negotiations were underway, but both the Argentine representative, Perez de 
Cuellar, and the UK representative, Baron Pym, were instructed not to give in an inch, by General 
Galtieri and PM Thatcher, respectively. As the world leaders gathered to a United Nations summit 
in Versailles on June 3rd, after lengthy negotiations, Britain gained the united support of the world, 
and it was decided that Argentina would have to withdraw its troops and let Britain reclaim and 
rebuild the islands before they had to withdraw. Up to this point, the Task Force had retaken much 
of the islands, and Argentinian defeat was imminent, nonetheless. (Freedman, 2005b, pp. 342-343.) 
3.4 The Battle of Goose Green 
May 27th marked the day when the amphibious ships had disembarked their troops, and the Bristol 
carrier group had arrived. The Argentinian Navy had also retreated, as they thought that the odds 
against them were heavily unfavourable and went hiding in Argentina’s coastal waters. May 30th 
was the first time when Argentinian Air Force and Naval Aviation co-operated, sending in 6 
fighters to attack the British. Their aim was to destroy the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible, but due to 
misinformation, shot the last remaining airborne Exocet missile in the whole country at HMS 
Avenger, and missed the target. The first two fighters then veered off to refuel, and the remaining 
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four were met with anti-air missiles, and two were taken down. This raid was considered a huge 
failure from the Argentinians. They had no airborne anti-ship missiles left, but no-one else knew 
about it, and the threat still lingered. (Freedman, 2005b, pp. 346-347.) 
While the war raged on sea, preparations for the land attack were underway. Goose Green, the 
second largest settlement after Stanley, was the next step in retaking the islands. Some higher-ups 
feared that Goose Green would be a distraction from Stanley, the main target. The Task Force’s 
reconnaissance had figured out a route to Stanley with only a little resistance, but the commanders 
were divided. Argentinians stationed at Goose Green could flank the British if they found about 
their plans to advance to Stanley. This, and the notion of showing the UK that the Task Force is 
making good progress, decided that Goose Green would be recaptured. The amphibious assault 
ships had unloaded and were leaving San Carlos, and the Argentinian Air Force set their sights on 
the men ashore. A raid consisting of four A4B fighters dropped their bombs, killing six and injuring 
30 others. To the Britons’ relief, the bombs hitting the medical and logistics teams did not explode, 
due to the planes flying low. Losing those two components would have been disastrous to the 
offensive. This attack served as an incentive to keep moving further inland, to better air cover. 
(Freedman, 2005b, p. 355.) 
While preparing to assault Goose Green, the soldiers heard on BBC radio that they had already 
taken the settlement. Both astonished and disappointed, their morale took a hit from the fake news, 
and the attack helicopter sighted around Goose Green did not help. BBC’s representative on the 
islands, Robert Fox, took the initial blame, but was innocent. In truth, the BBC in UK 
misinterpreted Minister of Defence John Nott’s statement that the troops were advancing. The press 
did not know how much the troops had moved, so they assumed Goose Green was taken. Perhaps 
the BBC pulled the trigger on this just to get the word out first and claim the bragging rights. The 
news reached Argentina, but they dismissed it as propaganda and psychological warfare. Concern 
raised among British troops; had their element of surprise been lost? Argentinian plans were not 
changed regarding the news, but the British could not know that. (Freedman, 2005b, pp. 356-357.) 
Nonetheless, the assault on Goose Green had to begin soon. 2nd Battalion, Parachute Regiment, 
known as 2 Para and consisting of 620 men, was assigned this task. May 28th, at 2 AM, the attack 
begun with fire support from HMS Arrow. Half an hour later, the first company from 2 Para 
engaged the first Argentinian encampment on the hills surrounding Goose Green, but to their 
surprise, the enemy retreated without much resistance due to the naval fire support. At dawn, 2 Para 
had made good progress in Goose Green, but only now were they facing the main Argentinian 
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force. HMS Arrow had to leave for its own safety, and poor weather conditions did not allow for 
Harrier fighter jets to support the troops on the ground. Daylight would turn the tide of battle for the 
defenders, and the Argentinians were well entrenched. The attack lost its tempo and was slowing 
down significantly. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 364.) 
From this assault, a great story was born. Colonel Jones, 2 Para’s commanding officer, decided to 
lead from the front. Other commanders would often stay back and protected, but Jones lead by 
example. He charged forward, despite the heavy incoming fire. He was hit but carried on regardless 
of his injuries. After being hit a second time, he finally fell, for the last time. News quickly reached 
HQ, but the British troops did not lose faith, and with resilience, they pressed on. Along with them, 
the troops had 66mm anti-tank rockets, and they were put to good use, destroying the machine gun 
trench and allowing further movement. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 365.) Colonel Jones was 
posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross, the highest commendation a Briton can get. (The 
London Gazette, 1982, p. 12831.) 
Soon after this, the Argentinians raised white flags, seeing as they had lost 18 men and 36 were 
wounded, totalling up to over half of the 92 men they had. Progress had indeed been made, and the 
probability of an Argentinian counterattack succeeding was lowered. Still, by midday, the battle 
was going, and it was long overtime. Daylight favoured the defenders, and as the original British 
plan was to swiftly cut through the trenches, their supplies were not quite enough for a drawn-out 
battle. The Argentinians were even using immoral tactics; raising a white flag to indicate 
surrendering, but as the Brits moved to investigate, they would open fire again. (Freedman, 2005b, 
p. 366.) 
Coming into the town proper of Goose Green, the civilians held there raised caution. The British 
drafted an ultimatum, and it was sent to the Argentinians by an Argentinian prisoner of war. It 
contained 2 options: surrender or be met with lethal force. The Argentinian commanders had 
realised that they could not hold out indefinitely and ordered their troops to stand down. The Union 
Jack flew once again above Goose Green, and 112 civilians were released unharmed. Seeing that 
the Argentinian forces were pushed back but not defeated, the battle could have taken many lives of 
soldiers and civilians alike. Evidence supports the fact that Argentinian forces were poorly supplied, 
as the houses were looted for food. The victory at Goose Green gave promise to the Task Force that 
their mission could be accomplished, and the Falkland Islands be liberated. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 
368-369.) 
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After claiming the hills west of Stanley, it was time to move in on the capital. Resistance was 
expected to be heavy, with numbers up to 8 000 Argentinians were speculated to be garrisoned in 
Stanley. (p.370.) At Goose Green, the Task Force learned the importance of fire support. Lack of it 
in the battle lead to significantly slower movement and strained the capabilities of troops. Some 
time had passed as the force made its way across the hills, and on June 14th, the time had come for 
the final stretch. Argentinians were retreating from the nearby hills and settlements towards Stanley, 
worn out both physically and mentally from the battles. The final skirmish was at noon, and after 
that, the road to Stanley was open. British forces closed in on Stanley from every direction, as it 
became clear that the Argentinians did not want to resist further. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 414.) 
3.5 Argentina Surrenders 
After what happened at Goose Green, the Argentinians on the Falkland Islands had discussed 
surrendering. On June 12th, commander of the Argentinian forces on the islands, Major General 
Menendez contacted then-president Galtieri and explained that further resistance would result in 
only more casualties for nothing. Galtieri could not believe it and told Menendez to keep fighting 
with every available asset. As Menendez told him that there was basically nothing to fight with 
anymore, and the men were on the verge of collapsing from exhaustion, Galtieri finally gave the 
order to start negotiations, even so with unreasonable conditions. Due to broken links in the chain of 
command, Menendez could not tell the Navy and Air Force to stand down, only his own Army on 
the islands. He contacted Galtieri once again and received assurance that the Navy and Air Force 
would retreat. The word took some time to reach every Argentinian soldier, some of them kept 
fighting until the 14th. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 419-420.) 
After the victory, there were no parades or cheering civilians waiting in Stanley. The troops were 
exhausted, hungry and water was running low. Many buildings were destroyed in the shelling, 
including houses and the water filtration plant. Men were starting to get restless, and after some 
looting incidents had taken place, a curfew was implemented. Days passed, and finally, on 25th of 
June, the first ships could head back to the United Kingdom. It was until September that the final 
ships were repaired and ready to depart on the long voyage back home. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 421.) 
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4. Media aboard the Task Force 
Regarding media coverage of the event, due to its nature and location far away, there was sparsely 
any third-party information available. Almost all the news came to the UK through military and 
government channels, and some through the United States. The UK press was had to be controlled 
to prohibit release of potentially dangerous information, as on the May 3rd issue of the Daily 
Express, where members of the Special Boat Squadron could be identified. So-called “minders”, 
government officials, had to be assigned to each media house, and they would then help to assess if 
the information about to be released would be harmful. These minders were perhaps too eager on 
their mission, as the post-war studies show: whole stories were erased, and alterations were made 
because of “too many emotional adjectives”, rather than just the offending sentences altered not to 
have sensitive information. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 263.) 
Britain still wanted the people to know what was going on, but only the good news. Bad news, such 
as the sinking of HMS Sheffield, could have a negative effect on the people’s opinion of defending 
the Falkland Islands. The handful of press representatives on board the Task Force’s ships were 
severely restricted in what they could report on. News reached London faster through other routes 
than through them, and naturally the representatives were dissatisfied with their treatment. The 
commander of the aircraft carrier group, Admiral Woodward, had to deal with the press and saw 
this as an additional burden on his already busy schedule. This clash of interest would have its 
effect, when Woodward’s words were taken out of context, and the message was now that the 
conflict will be long and bloody, which was not the Admiral’s intention. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 264.) 
The British Broadcasting Corporation, known worldwide as BBC, had a confrontation with the 
Ministry of Defence back in London. The Corporation’s policy of “balance”, where Argentinian 
and British sources were treated as equally creditable, raised thought in the MoD. BBC was irritated 
by the MoD, because they knew that they were not always given the whole truth, and their 
independence and credit were at risk. They also had to worry about their journalist detachment of 
the conflict, since it was easy to fall for calling British forces “ours”, and the journalists were 
specifically told not to do so. The Editor of News and Current Affairs at BBC stated that “we are 
not Britain”, “we are the BBC”, and the usage of “our” should be left for BBC affairs, to avoid 
taking sides and to retain their independence from the government. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 265.) 
After the HMS Sheffield had taken the fatal hit and was doomed to sink, the military commanders 
in charge wanted to withhold the news, to keep the sinking out of Argentinian ears. Since the 
THE FALKLANDS WAR AND 
PRESS COVERAGE 
 16 
 
 
Argentinian force lacked the ability to perform post- attack reconnaissance and confirm the hit, they 
would know if their attacks were successes by looking at British media. It has been said, that if the 
Sheffield sinking had been kept a secret, Argentina would have deemed the Exocet missiles 
incapable and used some other weapon, with less actual capabilities. A smaller, but yet important 
matter was informing the families of the ones lost on HMS Sheffield, not letting them see it on the 
news first and get a confirmation later. As a response, Ministry of Defence ruled that news would 
not be delayed, to keep false rumours from spreading and causing ill effects in the people. Since 
everyone cannot be appeased, the families of the ones aboard Sheffield were unhappy of their 
treatment, and reporters harassing them for a reaction caused further unrest. (Freedman, 2005b, p. 
266.) 
To counter the negative effects of media, a Special Projects Group (SPG) was established for 
deception and psychological operations. Their task was to help the Task Force’s public image by 
presenting their actions and capabilities in a better light, and to discredit and demoralise 
Argentinian forces. Since the British media was a source of information for Argentina, the Special 
Projects Group would mislead them about timing of attacks and other small details, without actually 
creating false information, so the public would not notice. BBC could not be used for psychological 
operations, to keep its public image untarnished, so the Special Projects Group would use the UK’s 
secret services to plant false information into the Argentinian garrison on the Falkland Islands. 
Claims of rivalries between military branches, rumours about the junta’s internal disputes, and 
economic discrepancies were planted to raise dissatisfaction and lower morale amongst the 
Argentinians. (Freedman, 2005b, pp. 266-267.) 
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5. Methodology 
The aim of Critical Discourse Analysis, CDA for short, is described by Fairclough (2010) as “to 
develop ways of analysing language which address its involvement in the workings of 
contemporary capitalist societies.” (p. 10). As for analysis itself using CDA, Fairclough says: “It is 
not analysis of discourse ‘in itself’ as one might take it to be, but analysis of dialectical relations 
between discourse and other objects, elements or moments, as well as analysis of the ‘internal 
relations’ of discourse. Since analysis of such relations cuts across conventional boundaries 
between disciplines (linguistics, politics, sociology and so forth), CDA is an interdisciplinary form 
of analysis, or as I shall prefer to call it a transdisciplinary form.” (2010, p. 10.) From here, it can 
be deducted that text is not the only form of affecting, and we must take the author, the media, the 
targeted audience and the desired outcome in consideration as we analyse the newspapers.  
For methods, Fairclough gives us four stages (2010, p. 226): 
Stage 1: Focus upon a social wrong, in its semiotic aspect. 
Stage 2: Identify obstacles to addressing the social wrong. 
Stage 3: Consider whether the social order ‘needs’ the social wrong. 
Stage 4: Identify possible ways past the obstacles. 
Using these stages, or steps as they are a guideline, we can dissect an article and determine its 
reasons for doing what it had done, why the writer used language as such and so forth. Social 
wrongs can be phenomena such as dehumanising the enemy in warfare, and obstacles to addressing 
it are things that make the righting of the wrong harder, for example the origin country of the 
publication and the reigning political atmosphere in said country. The social order needing the 
social wrong will be discussed further on, as we get into the newspapers themselves, as well as the 
possible ways past them. Often, in matters regarding tabloids, the language and its goal are the 
problem. 
 
 
  
THE FALKLANDS WAR AND 
PRESS COVERAGE 
 18 
 
 
6. Material: Newspapers 
Modern-day British newspapers have long roots, some extending to the 1700’s. Newspapers’ sales 
figures have gone down since the dawn of internet, but they still have a place in the British society 
as a stable of reputable information, at least some of them. UK newspapers can be divided into 
subgroups, popular/tabloid and quality press/broadsheet. The tabloid group can be split into two 
even smaller groups, respectable and sensationalist tabloids. Tabloids’ articles are usually short, and 
the pages are filled with material to look at more than read; pictures, large headlines and colourful 
advertising, as Jeremy Tunstall says. (Cited by Bellot, 2018, p. 86.) 
The broadsheet or as they are colloquially known, “heavies”, are usually more objective in their 
narrative, with the articles being longer and more thought-provoking. (Tunstall, cited by Bellot, 
2018, p.86.) From here, we can argue that the papers cater to different audiences: Tabloids’ main 
consumers are low- to middle-class, working class citizens with little time to read long, sprawling 
articles, as they just want the quick news in form of headlines. Broadsheet readers can be generally 
speaking said to be well-educated, higher class people, with time and will to truly read into the 
article and think more about the subject. For the subject of examination, there are two front pages of 
The Sun, and two front pages and two articles from The Guardian from the Falklands War time 
period to analyse in this thesis. 
6.1. The Sun 
The Sun is a tabloid newspaper in the United Kingdom, established in its current form in 1969, after 
it was purchased by Rupert Murdoch and his News Corp. The paper has a circulation of around 1,4 
million papers sold daily, (newsworks.org.uk, 2019) with article emphasis on celebrities, sports, and 
other phenomena of the like. The Sun has a somewhat negative reputation, due to its controversial 
involvement in matters such as the Hillsborough Stadium disaster in 1989, where 96 people died as 
a result of a stand collapsing during a football match between Nottingham Forest and Liverpool FC. 
Some days later, while the people of England were still mourning the lost lives, The Sun’s headline 
falsely read “THE TRUTH: - Some fans picked pockets of victims -Some fans urinated on the brave 
cops -Some fans beat up PC giving kiss of life”, this referring to Liverpool fans. Later on, these 
accusations were proven false, but the people of Liverpool still refer to The Sun as “The Scum”, for 
loathing their image in the eyes of other Englishmen. (Carter & Gibson, 2009.) Even though this 
happened later in the 1980’s, the coverage of Hillsborough Stadium defines The Sun and 
crystallises their ruthless attitude towards journalism. 
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6.2 The Guardian 
Originally founded as The Manchester Guardian in 1821, The Guardian is a well-established 
broadsheet paper in the United Kingdom. The owner of the paper in 1936, John Russell Scott, 
established the Scott Trust to strengthen the paper’s financial matters, as well as its independency. 
He announced that all the funds that would have otherwise been divided among shareholders, would 
now be held in the Trust, and from there, the surplus funds would be used to further improve the 
paper and expand circulation. With sales figures rising steadily, the Manchester Guardian renamed 
itself to just The Guardian, representing it’s spread across the island nation. Further establishing its 
nationwide position, the paper’s head office and editorial staff were moved to London in 1964. The 
rise would not be infinite, and The Guardian relied heavily on outside resources for financial 
support. (History of the Guardian, 2017.) 
During the mid-1960’s, there were talks with The Times to relieve both parties’ financial struggles 
by merging into one bigger company, but the editor of The Guardian at the time, Alastair 
Hetherington, would not give the paper’s independence away so easily. This move, and 
Hetherington’s overall vision still acts as a guideline for the modern Guardian to follow. After the 
financial struggles were over decades later, the political climate had polarised. The Guardian 
aligned itself with the left, cementing its position with the coverage of the Miners’ Strike in 1984-
1985. A competitor emerged in 1986, when the Independent released it’s first issue. Filling the 
political void between The Guardian on the left and the Times and the Telegraph on the right, the 
rising circulation of the Independent brought life to the stagnated newspaper market. (History of the 
Guardian, 2017.) 
Trying to re-establish their image as the leading press and distinguishing themselves from their 
former, struggling selves, The Guardian revamped its design in 1988, marking the start of the 
paper’s modern era. As the Independent and the Times were competing with prices, the Times 
hitting as low as 20 pence for an issue, the Guardian stayed at full price, directing funds towards 
better quality journalism and trying to stay ahead in publishing breaking news. For the whole 
2000’s, The Guardian has remained a staple of journalist standards in the United Kingdom, 
consistently winning awards across the journalistic section. In 2005, the paper was shrunk into the 
mid-size Berliner format, and in 2018, further into the tabloid format, trying to stay convenient and 
competitive in the modern era of instant news read from smart devices and computers. (History of 
the Guardian, 2017.) 
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7. Analysis 
The analysis of the newspapers covering the Falklands War revolves around Critical Discourse 
Analysis and following the four stages presented by Fairclough (2010, p. 226). Of course, being as 
multi-faceted as it is, there is much room left for personal interpretation and analysis. Knowing that 
Argentina was the initial aggressor in the conflict, media impressions would impedingly be negative 
towards them. The United Kingdom was the expected victor, and the UK newspapers do reflect that 
attitude, capitalising on losses of friendly ships and lives. 
7.1. Analysis of The Sun 
 
Figure 2. The Sun, May 4th, 1982, front page. 
The most infamous example of The Sun’s aggressive and pro-war journalism is the “GOTCHA” 
headline on May 4th, in reference to the sinking of ARA General Belgrano. The attack was the first 
real battle contact in the war that had lasted for over a month by then, and the press, especially the 
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tabloids, were desperate for something concrete to report on. Referring to Fairclough’s CDA stages 
(2010, p. 226), we can begin to analyse the meaning behind this front page. The social wrong in this 
case is the Falklands War and the (mis-)representation of the Argentinians in relation to the British 
in the Sun. Obstacles in the way of addressing the social wrong are for example the publication 
coming from the United Kingdom. It is hard to stay unbiased, if you or in this case, your nation is 
taking part in a conflict, where in the end a winner will emerge. Positive and negative biases are 
bound to emerge towards your own side and the opposing side, respectively. 
The lead paragraph on the front page reads: “THE NAVY had the Argies on their knees last night 
after a devastating double punch.” Analysing only this one sentence, we can see multiple errors in 
taste and journalism standards. The word “Argie” or “Args” is often repeated in The Sun’s 
coverage, and by using it, the paper tries to rob the Argentinian forces of their pride, achievements 
and credit. “Argie” instead of Argentinian, sounds playful, even childish, and presents the enemy as 
not very serious, a small threat that can be easily thwarted. By using the phrase “on their knees” 
paints a mental image of the Argentinians being literally on their knees against the superior Brits, a 
very generalising and perhaps even a false statement, as we know from the history portion of this 
thesis that the Argentinians were a serious contender, afflicting heavy casualties upon the British. 
“A devastating double punch”, referring to the sinking of ARA General Belgrano and a second 
Argentinian ship, yet again adds to the mental image where the two sides of battle are two persons 
throwing punches at each other. This is perhaps an easier way for the general public to understand 
the battles, instead of elaborate depictions of how the battles went in reality.  
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Figure 3. The Sun, April 20th, 1982, front page.  
 
Some two weeks earlier, April 20th, The Sun reported on Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
deciding not to give up on the Falkland Islands, effectively announcing war with Argentina. The 
headline “STICK IT UP YOUR JUNTA”, referring to the Argentinian military government, the 
Junta, was not said by any official, and was made up only to provoke the British people. (See figure 
3.) A common way of expressing dissatisfaction with someone and an idea, for example, is to tell 
them to “stick it up your…”. This is a very derogatory expression, and in conjunction of the 
Argentinian government, very unfit for a press headline. The sub-headline, reading “1am: Maggie 
No to deal – then Argentina invokes war treaty”, tries to tell the people that Argentina is the sole 
antagonist in this whole crisis, and mighty Britain just has to go to war with them. Of course, war 
was not the only possible course of action, and Margaret Thatcher’s gamble of a decision to go to 
war could have ended badly.  
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The use of the nickname “Maggie” for Margaret Thatcher was perhaps a measure to save real estate 
on the valuable front page, but perhaps as a way to diminish her value as Prime Minister. After all, 
she was the first female Prime Minister in the United Kingdom, and her support before the 
Falklands War was receding due to the recession and climbing unemployment rate. (Denman; 
McDonald, 1996, p. 7.) Thatcher was a Conservative, centre-right, and The Sun was right wing as 
well, but it might have been that her being female, The Sun would have wanted a man leading the 
party and the government. 
5.2. Analysis of The Guardian 
The Guardian, being a broadsheet paper, covered the Falklands War in a neutral style, with more 
respect to both sides of the war. In contrast to The Sun, their coverage extended over diplomacy 
matters as well, as the sub- headline in the issue of April 5th says: “Intense diplomatic activity 
begins as Falklands are placed under curfew and task force prepares”. Indeed, the main headline 
says: “We won’t hesitate, says Nott”, but that is at least somewhat informative, in comparison to 
tabloid headlines. The juxtaposing of “Argies” and “our lads” is neutralized to just Argentinians and 
British. In the 4-paragraph article, not a single time was “our” or “their” mentioned, as the paper 
wished to remain neutral and a third-party observer of the conflict, not an active participator. 
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Figure 4. The Guardian, May 4th, 1982. 
On May 4th, as the battles had truly begun, and lives were lost, The Guardian reported on the losses 
of destroyer HMS Sheffield and one fighter jet, a Sea Harrier, as seen in figure 4. This is not from 
the front page, but in turn, it gives a good example of the use of language. The coverage is still 
neutral, but this time, the article is 23 paragraphs long, a very detailed description on what 
happened to the destroyer and the fighter jet, and also has comments from Defence Ministry 
officials. The article explains that HMS Sheffield was sunk by an Exocet missile and goes on to 
elaborate of the Exocet’s French origins and its tactical capabilities, such as “fire and forget” and 
sea skimming abilities. This points us towards the targeted audience: highly educated men, perhaps 
with military knowledge back from World War II, and people with genuine interest in the matter. 
Yet again, no sign of “our” and “their”, as the style remains neutral even with serious British 
casualties.  
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Figure 5. The Guardian, May 5th, 1982. 
The following day, in the issue of May 5th, the article titled “Fleet may pull back to avoid missile 
attacks” (see figure 5) begins by telling that the burning remains of HMS Sheffield are still afloat, 
and by describing it as “visible proof of a fatal flaw in the air defences of the Royal Navy’s task 
force”. This is a bold statement to make, seeing as the loss of the destroyer was already a great one 
to the nation. The article goes on to state that the Argentine fighter jets, armed with Exocet missiles, 
is a formidable foe to the British task force, and the fleet has to pull back to remain safe from 
attacks. Sensationalist publications were not exactly eager to publish this kind of information, since 
their pro-war stance prohibits admitting defeats.  
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Figure 6. The Guardian, June 15th, 1982, front page. 
The Argentinian force surrenders on June 14th, and the issue of June 15th reported on the British 
victory. “Ceasefire in Falklands as Stanley is surrendered”, reads the front-page headline (see figure 
6). The article goes on to tell how Thatcher told the House of Commons that the Argentinians had 
retreated. This decisive victory would have been the perfect opportunity to tell how “our lads” were 
valiant and heroic in their conquest of the lost lands, but in broadsheet style, The Guardian states 
the fact that although the Argentinians have surrendered, there will be no further repercussions 
forced on them, and no war crimes will be tolerated. 
These were the first news of the Argentinian surrender and the possible end of the war, and there 
was not any political influence yet, only the situation explained as well as possible. Only 
afterwards, The Guardian praises Margaret Thatcher for her role in the decision-making. Here, the 
focus is on the islands rather than in the Parliament, with pictures of the commanders of both sides, 
Major-General Jeremy Moore and General Menendez, from Britain and Argentina, respectively. 
Also, the map of the eastern side of East Falklands is shown, to put the fight for Stanley in 
proportion to the general audience.  
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Figure 7. The Guardian, June 16th, 1982, front page. 
On June 16th, two days after the Argentinian forces had surrendered, The Guardian’s front-page 
headline was “Thatcher triumphs as war doubts linger”, as seen in figure 7. Since Thatcher was 
indeed the main driving force of the British decision to go to war, it is only natural to give her credit 
for the victory. At this point though, there were Argentinian troops on the islands, and the Navy and 
Air Force components coming from mainland Argentina could not be assured as surrendered. 
Interestingly, the victory is credited to Margaret Thatcher in the headline, and the first paragraph 
reads “The Prime Minister last night secured the greatest personal political triumph from her 
parliamentary colleagues since the end of the second world war.” This might incline that The 
Guardian was pro-Thatcher at the time, since many other reasons contributed towards winning the 
war, not just the Prime Minister. Of course, Thatcher was the main driving force in the decision 
going to war, and since other MoP’s (Members of the Parliament) were prepared to just give the 
Falklands away, it was not completely unreasonable to give Thatcher the credit she deserved.  
Another interesting point is that in the main picture on the front page is not Thatcher, even though 
the headline refers to her. Pictured there, again, is Major-General Moore, the commander of the 
Task Force, being greeted heartily by civilians in Stanley. This picture gives the campaign a worker 
figure, someone for the general public to thank for the actual battles won on the islands.  
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6. Conclusion 
The Falklands War was a result of long-standing border disputes, as well as Argentina’s new 
government’s desire to prove their worth to their own people, and to show the world that they are a 
formidable military and political force by trying to claim the Falkland Islands. Since it takes more 
than one to wage war, Britain can not be left out of this “spotlight of shame”; Margaret Thatcher 
was keen on proving herself to the world as well, being the first female Prime Minister of the 
United Kingdom. Her quick decision to go to war could have ended disastrously, but seasoned 
commanders in the Task Force played their part excellently, and the islands remained British. As 
said before, if the UK would have given up on the Falklands, it would have demonstrated the world, 
how the Commonwealth had weakened, and could not defend all its areas and inhabitants. Thatcher 
gambled heavily, going against a force that could use land ports and airfields, but the UK’s 
technological and strategic superiority did prove itself. 
In the light of the evidence presented, it is reasonable to argue that not all British newspapers were 
equal in terms of neutrality and professionalism, regarding their coverage of the Falklands War. 
Tabloid papers and their use of language had tendencies of political influencing and glorification of 
war. The usage of “ours” versus “the Argies” is a prime example of xenophobic attitude towards the 
Argentinians, robbing them of their proper term, denouncing them with a bare nickname. The 
British war effort is referred to as “ours” by The Sun, making it feel that much more emotional to 
the British nation. BBC was specifically telling its journalists to adhere to standards of good 
journalism and not use the term, instead referring it as “British”, and retain their neutrality that way. 
Critical Discourse Analysis proved as a valuable asset in examining The Sun and exposing their 
unprofessional attitude towards Argentinians in the Falklands War. The Guardian, on the other 
hand, had a more dignified approach, with their headlines and frontpages providing more 
information to the readers. Their content was also more neutral, with both participants of the war 
being referred with their proper names, in all honesty and neutrality. 
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